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Bringing the study of warfare into theories of nationalism1 
 
John Hutchinson 
Department of Government, London School of Economics  
 
Abstract 
This article argues that warfare has been marginalised in theories of nationalism, but 
that in conjunction with nationalism is vital for understanding the rise of nation-states, 
the formation of nations and the nature of the international system. It offers a critique 
of statist approaches, suggests mechanisms through which warfare may sacralise 
nations, and explores different patterns of nation-state formation as they affect the 
interstate system.  In particular, it emphasises tensions between state- and nation-
formation as activated by the fortunes of war and the destabilising effects of waves of 
imperial dissolution, which are accompanied by   patterns of re-imperialization.   It 
suggests that it is simplistic both to claim that war has led to a transition from empires 
to nation-states and that contemporary practices of war-making have led to a post-
national era.  
Key words: warfare; state formation, national sacralisation; international system; 
empire; postnationalism. 
 
 
Introduction 
                                       
1 * Editor’s note: this is a revised version of the ASEN / Nations and Nationalism 
Ernest Gellner Nationalism Lecture, delivered at the Birkbeck, University of London, 
26 March 2017. 
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The study of warfare remains a lacuna in theories of nationalism, including the work 
of Ernest Gellner who is deservedly regarded as a foundational scholar in the field.  
Until his late writings Gellner’s view of nationalism was benign, understanding it as a 
necessary concomitant of the transition from agro-literate to modern industrial 
societies.   So too was his conception of the resulting international order: the nation-
state system operated to decentre power, functioning as a series of (canal) locks.  
Potential conflict between ethnically diverse populations of unequal power was 
thereby defused so that each group could find its distinctive level in a competitive 
world. (Gellner 1964: 175-8).    In stressing the emancipatory aspects of nationalism 
and its compatibility with a liberal modernity, Gellner rightly redressed Elie 
Kedourie’s emphatically negative portrayal of nationalism as an irrationalist ideology 
that generated war and revolutionary upheavals (Kedourie 1966).   Nonetheless, he, 
like most theorists of nationalism, neglected the role of warfare in conjunction with 
nationalism as a causal force in the formation of nations, nation-states, and the 
international system.   
 I wish to address this failure and examine the very different view of our world 
that results, one that qualifies the connection between nationalism and modernisation.   
There are at least four reasons for bringing warfare (in its changing forms) into our 
theoretical understanding of nationalism (see further, Hutchinson 2017).  First, 
warfare has been central for much nation-state formation.  Michael Howard reminds 
us that most nation-states that came into existence before the mid-20th century were 
created by war or had their boundaries defined by wars or internal violence (Howard 
1991: 39–41).  It is also hardly an exaggeration to say that modern nationalism, in both 
its civic and ethnic varieties, crystallised in war.  The former was expressed during the 
victory of the French revolutionary army at the battle of Valmy in 1792 when the 
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French charged Prussian ranks to the cry ‘Vive la nation’ and sang La Marseillaise.   
The latter ethnic conception was articulated by Fichte in his ‘Addresses to the German 
Nation’ (1807) after Napoleon’s humiliation of Prussia at the battle of Jena.  Many 
nationalists subsequently have cited the willingness of populations to sacrifice 
themselves for the nation-state as an indicator of its validity. 
 Second, warfare has contributed to the formation of nations.  The constitutive 
myths of many nations are derived from war experiences, shaping perceptions of the 
fundamental values of populations and their place in space and in time.  Wars have 
often operated in the perception of nationalists as critical junctures in the history of 
nations for good or ill.  Most societies have many such martial time markers of great 
victories as well as calamitous defeats, and the memories of these contrasting fortunes 
are invoked to draw moral lessons.  In the words of Ernest Renan (1882: 26-9) ‘a 
heritage of glory and a reluctance to break apart, to realize the same programme in the 
future; to have suffered , worked, hoped together; that is worth more than common 
taxes and frontiers… In fact, national sorrows are more significant than triumphs 
because they impose obligations and demand a common effort.’      An awareness of 
the vicissitudes of war and the vulnerabilities of even the greatest states has often 
given heart to nationalists fretting against the subordination of their peoples in 
imperial states (Talmon 1960: 270-1)  
  Third, the world order of nation-states is a recent product of the total wars 
that resulted in the collapse of European empires in a series of convulsive moments in 
the 20th century.  These had the effects of propelling a mass of ill-defined and fragile 
post-colonial territorial units onto the world stage.   Although institutions of 
transnational governance, such as the League of Nations and the UN) were created in 
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the aftermath of these wars, they have failed to resolve the security problems created 
by these transitions.  
 Fourth, contemporary military revolutions (namely, the spread of high 
precision weaponry and developments in asymmetric war) in the context of this new 
global order are arguably transforming both war-making and collective identity 
formation..  On the one hand, we see a decline of interstate war in favour of coalitions 
of nation-states undertaking peace-keeping interventions that are justified by universal 
mandates.  On the other, there is a proliferation of intra-state wars outside the west.  
This is affecting how populations relate to their state, both in the West and outside the 
West and has generated debates about whether we are moving into a post national 
world. 
 It is therefore surprising that war has been relatively neglected in theories of 
nationalism, which tend to explain the rise of nations and nation-states as products of 
modernization.   I use Miguel Centeno’s (2002: 34) definition of war as ‘a substantial 
armed conflict between organized military forces of independent political units’.  I 
expand, however, the term to refer also to peace-time institutional initiatives and 
practices related to military preparedness.  When discussing the topic, we must also 
recognise the different forms of martial activity.  Wars can be interstate, intrastate, 
imperial and liberation in character (See Leonhard 2006). They also vary enormously 
in their military organization and in the range of sectors mobilized, which in the case 
of ‘total wars’ may include much of society.    
 Defining nations and nationalism is more controversial.  I agree with the 
modernists that nationalism as an ideological movement is predominantly a post-18th 
century phenomenon, although nationalist sentiments that could mobilise people are 
much older.  I also accept Susan Reynolds’ arguments for the existence of nations in 
at least parts of medieval Europe (Reynolds 1997: Ch. 8).  These were conceived by 
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their members as natural, objective communities of descent, possessing distinctive 
cultural attributes and with rights to be self-governing.  Such nations lacked many 
elements of modern nations, including concepts of popular sovereignty, and national 
loyalties might only be intermittently salient, often being subordinate to dynastic, 
religious and imperial allegiances.  Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the significance of 
national loyalties as causal factors. 
 
War and the Nation-State 
 
These criticisms do not at first sight apply to the work of Charles Tilly (1992) and 
Michael Mann (1986; 1993; 1995) who argue first that the modern nation-state is a 
by-product of rulers’ efforts to acquire the means of war and second that war is an 
organizational phenomenon from which the state derived its administrative machinery 
(Centeno 2002: 101).  The two are mutually reinforcing, as summarized in Tilly’s 
dictum ‘war made states and states made war’.  Here I define ‘state’ in modified 
Weberian terms to refer to a differentiated polity that exercises the durable control (if 
not the monopoly) of the legitimate violence over a territory.1  The setting of their 
analysis is post-Roman Europe, a multi-actor Christian civilization of heterogeneous 
political units (including empires, city-states, dynastic kingdoms) whose major 
polities fought to become an imperial hegemon.   Both scholars draw on the 
substantial historiography on the European ‘military revolution’ of the early modern 
era conceptualised by Michael Roberts (1956), Geoffrey Parker (1976, 1996), Jeremy 
Black (1994), and W. H. McNeill (1984).   This revolution resulted in new 
technologies, tactics and strategies, and a rapid increase in the size of armies relative 
to the population.  
6 
 
 Tilly (1992: esp. Chs. 1,3) argues this military revolution favoured centralised 
political administrations able to combine the power of coercion and capital to levy 
taxes, raise large permanent (standing) armies, and draw on revenues derived from 
trade and commercialised agriculture.   Kingdoms such as England and France rose in 
strength in relation to mercantile city-states (able to draw on capital to hire 
mercenaries but weak in coercive capacity since merchants can move) and over time 
agrarian empires (strong in coercive power through which they could raise peasant 
levies, but lacking capital resources).   Their rulers could centralise power within the 
territory by using standing armies to quell internal challenges to their rule.  These 
kingdoms became the prototypes of the nation-state.  State centralising pressures and 
recurrent wars between conscripted armies encouraged a growing identification with 
the territory of the state rather than just one’s locality, resulting in a growing national 
consciousness.  When populations revolted against state exactions, they came to stage 
national rather than local revolts.  A decisive moment was the French Revolution, 
which in transforming a dynastic into a people’s state created the nation-state model 
(Tilly 1992: Ch.4).  The military power of the nation-state drawing on the energies of 
its whole population in the form of ideologically-committed, mass conscription 
armies ensured its universal diffusion.   
In Tilly’s account nationalism and the nation-state are late derivatives of state-
induced territorial consolidation.  Mann (1993: 215-8; 1995: 45-8) is more nuanced in 
acknowledging the existence of proto-national loyalties from the time of the 
Reformation onwards, but argues that these have little organisational significance in 
themselves: it is only when they become fused with the horizontal politics of 
citizenship (during the French Revolution) that we get modern nationalism.  In 
Mann’s account nation-states form from the increasing war-induced pressures of the 
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late 18th century state (via taxes and conscription) on the new social classes emerging 
from industrial capitalism.  This produces a variety of political movements 
demanding representation in the state as the key territorial institution.  Nationalism 
originated as a drive for democracy.  During their competitive struggle for political 
representation both the bourgeoisie and working class came to identify with (were 
caged within) the state, as the nation-state. 
These accounts have been subject to significant criticism.  Miguel Centeno 
(2002) argues these accounts are Eurocentric, since the military-fiscal-extraction 
mechanism they identify does not apply to Latin America or post-colonial Africa, 
where states with some exceptions have gone to war infrequently with each other.  A 
still more fundamental objection is that even in their European setting both neglect 
the existence of national sentiments and national communities during the early 
Middle Ages, which emerged independently of war.   We need a much more long-
term and interactive conception of the relationships between warfare and state-
formation and warfare and nation-formation in Europe.  
 Early medieval nations, taking on ‘sacred’ qualities via associations with the 
Crusades, played a crucial role in territorial state-formation and war-making.  
Crusading wars against both Islamic territories and internal heretics (e.g. Cathars) 
were important sources of state-building, used by rulers to centralize power, impose 
taxation legitimized by Papal Bulls over clergy and laity, and pursue territorial 
expansion.  Ernst Kantorowicz (1951; 1957: 236-42) argues that consequently the 
concept of martial martyrdom became this-worldly to encompass a heroic death for a 
terrestrial fatherland.   By the end of 13th century the idea of the loyal soldier dying for 
the patria was being charged with religious expression in state propaganda.  Norman 
Housley locates the growth of a sanctified patriotism that, to varying degrees, shaped 
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both state-building and popular mobilization from the 14th century in England and 
France (during the Hundred Years’ War), Bohemia (the Hussite rebellions) and the 
Spanish Habsburg territories.  Such conflicts were suffused with Crusading imagery 
and claims that kingdoms or peoples were new Israels (Housley 2000: 223-4).    
A related problem is the failure (especially on Tilly’s part) to explore the 
sources of the legitimacy of medieval and early modern states. An overstress on 
coercive power  insufficiently recognises that warfare could destroy states, as well as 
provoke rebellions in the name of the community of the realm (in Reynolds' terms, the 
nation).2  Although medieval monarchs (in England, France and Spain) had the rights 
to demand military service and taxation from their subjects, these could not be 
imposed without the consent of free men (Reynolds 1997: 305).  Much of the 
authority of rulers depended on their exercise of judicial, administrative, and law-
making duties which consumed in peace the majority of state expenditures. While war 
could extend the administrative and territorial reach of the state, it could also result in 
breakdowns of such key functions, as well as economic distress. (Gunn et al. 2008: 
386-8). 
 When this occurred a national sentiment crystallised intermittently against 
rulers to assert the rights of the ‘community of the realm’, represented by nobility, 
clergy and urban middling orders. Hoping to gain support from their subjects, 
monarchs appealed to xenophobic national sentiment by the 13th century:  King 
Edward 1 sought to deflect internal dissensions by claiming that the King of France 
planned to wipe out the English language (Reynolds 1997: 272), but monarchical 
failure – of Henry III in his wars against the French and the Welsh - provoked 
opposition on the part of the nobility and middling orders combined with demands 
that he rely on his natural counsellors and not aliens (Reynolds 1997: 270-1).   
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These patterns continued into the early modern period where the intertwining 
of religion and nationalist sentiments during the wars of the Counter Reformation 
could either strengthen or undermine the integrity of states.   Rulers, supporting the 
Catholic or Protestant cause in general European wars, sought to mobilize their 
populations against neighbouring powers and repress internal opposition from 
religious dissidents.   The attempt of the Catholic Spanish Habsburgs to extract 
taxation from their subjects in the (largely Protestant) United Provinces together with 
fears of the Inquisition provoked a large-scale revolt in 1572 (dubbed the Eighty 
Years’ War), during which competing ideas of the Dutch emerged against a Spanish 
‘Other’ (Duke 2004).  These were a Calvinist Hebraic belief (of chosenness); a 
republican ethnic myth (of descent from ancient Batavians); and a monarchical 
conception centred on the Orange princes.  The Calvinists supported a strong central 
government that would enforce an ecclesiastical discipline and the reconquest of the 
Catholic Southern Netherlands, and they generally allied with the monarchical-
patriarchal visions of the House of Orange, who portrayed themselves as modern 
Davids or Solomons. Their rivals were the regents of Holland, the strongest province 
and main carrier of Batavian myths, who supported separation from the South, state 
control over the Church, and a federal system that Holland could dominate. These 
external and internal conflicts formed the Dutch nation-state (Gorski 2000; 2006: 
151).   
 In 17th century Protestant England, encroachments on the rights of parliament 
by the Stuart monarchy - viewed as too close to the Catholic absolutist powers of 
France and Spain - triggered a civil war that enveloped Ireland, Scotland and England. 
During this conflict religio-national identities hardened.    On the parliamentary and 
puritan side, a popular English sentiment was directed not just against the Catholic 
Irish, but foreigners in general during the 1640s.  This included the Welsh who looked 
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to the Crown as a guarantor of their constitutional privileges in the ‘British’ state and 
eventually the Presbyterian Scots with whom the parliamentarians were initially 
allied.  Cromwell harnessed an English nationalism in his new model army to 
establish a Protestant Commonwealth (Stoyle 2000; 2005).  
 In short, in many parts of Europe in the early modern period national identities 
were formed and reformed from wars with neighbouring powers and from civil 
conflicts.   Mann’s claim that nationalism originated during the French Revolution as 
a drive for democracy and citizenship has to be qualified.   Many of the nationalisms 
(re-) emerging in response to the French revolution and invasions in Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Spain were conservative, supportive of older political and religious 
establishments (Nabulsi 1999: Ch.2; Verheijin  2016: 319-23). 
 
Warfare and the sacralisation of national communities 
 
Warfare then was ambiguous for state formation, sometimes accelerating it, 
sometimes threatening the integrity of states, depending on the characteristics of the 
populations they governed.  This suggests we need to separate out the processes by 
which war affects state-formation from those that shaped nation-formation before 
going on to examine the interaction between the two. 
A sense of national identity may emerge from many sources, including a sense 
of religious distinctiveness, explored in Anthony Smith’s Chosen Peoples (2003), as 
well as early state formation. However, we can identify four mechanisms through 
which warfare in premodern and modern eras contributed to the formation of nations 
as sacred communities of sacrifice (see Hutchinson 2009).  First, wars have offered 
raw material for ethnic mythomoteurs (constitutive myths) whose narratives (often 
shaped by religious conceptions) have endowed populations with a sense of meaning 
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and unique destiny, especially when wars are perceived to be turning points in the 
history of the community.  Second, they have produced we-they stereotypes that result 
in collective self-differentiation vis-á-vis threatening others.  Third, wars have 
generated public commemorative  rituals which produce a sense of in-group 
commonality.   Fourth, they have instigated political projects that embedded symbols 
and myths of war in everyday life.   
 With respect to the first, warfare might contribute to narratives of triumph 
such as the Spanish Reconquest myth of the unification of Spain under the Catholic 
monarchs of Castile and Aragon, followed by the establishment of a great empire in 
the Americas.  Memories of perceived disasters were also potent loci of identity 
insofar as they could ‘explain’ the miseries of the present.   These catastrophes might 
be associated with imperial subjugation: Greeks lamented the fall of their holy capital, 
Constantinople, and the wider Byzantine Empire in 1453 as well as their 
subordination within an Islamic Ottoman Empire. Often these explanations were 
couched in religious terms as either a punishment by God for deviating from his laws 
or as a trial of their faith in His Providence, combined with a promise of future 
redemption and liberation (Smith 2003).  But over time they also acquired an ethnic 
character.  Such memorializations in the premodern period were particularly potent 
when carried by multiple sites, including sacred religious texts, official chronicles, 
folktales, and epic poetry that celebrated great heroes who became role models, as 
well as identifying villains who betrayed the nation.  
In the era of modern nationalism wars could be viewed as test of the vitality of 
the nation measured by its ability to inspire heroic sacrifice.  New romantic genres in 
music, painting, drama and the novel celebrated eras of national grandeur and 
successive generations of heroic martyrdom.  Societies often had multiple and 
competing mythomoteurs.  Spanish liberals in the 19th century rejected the 
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Reconquista myth, instead presenting the guerrilla war against Napoleon as the 
origins of the Spanish nation, arguing that the triumph of the Catholic monarchy was 
a source of Spain’s decadence.  Such debates merely reinforced the significance 
(negative or positive) of the formative events.  
 Second, as Anthony Smith observed (1981), the war experience may unite 
previously disparate groups and differentiate them against threatening others. He 
proposed that in recurring dyadic conflicts between neighbouring populations warfare 
served to elaborate and harden ethnic group self-images, as we/they stereotypes were 
created by the competing propaganda of rival states.  This formed over time a 
common national consciousness.   Not all differentiation was invidious: close contact 
could make antagonists aware of the positive attributes of the other.  Robert and 
Isabelle Tombs, husband and wife, he English, she French, have documented the 
mutual fascination of the English-French relationship in their co-authored book That 
Sweet Enemy (2007), in which a Voltaire could praise English toleration, while Whig 
aristocrats sought to emulate French manners.  Such comparisons, whether negative 
or positive, tended to emphasise the distinctiveness of one’s nation.  
 Third, the threat of death and conquest can force populations to confront 
fundamental questions about their identity and purposes.  In these situations wars 
engender moments of ritual effervescence that seek to control overwhelming 
emotions and in turn create or re-inforce collective identities.    There were many 
kinds of such rituals, including the traditions of humility days in the USA, England 
and the Netherlands. These originated in the early modern but extended well into the 
modern period, when, policed by churches and political authorities, populations 
would seek collective atonement from God for their sins, now transposed from the 
individual to the nation (Callahan 2006).   
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With secularisation, however, the nation itself became deified and an object of 
worship, particularly in the cult of fallen soldiers, observed in the French revolution.   
Such commemorations of the national dead coming to the fore in a period of large-
scale conflict could be seen as a means of overcoming the anguish of mass death.  As 
George Mosse (1990) and Anthony Smith (2003: Chs. 2,9) also argued, they also had 
the capacity of binding survivors to the values for which the dead supposedly fought, 
thereby contributing to the formation of a cohesive community.  These 
commemorative rituals marked profound shifts in attitudes to death, time, and social 
status.  Whereas in premodern societies death meant an individual transition into an 
otherworldly realm, and death was differentiated by estate.  In contrast, in the this-
worldly and future-oriented ideology of nationalism the cult of the martial dead was 
democratized. Remembrance was no longer reserved for the nobility but now 
addressed all who had suffered for the nations (Koselleck (2002: 289–91).   
 Finally, the outcomes of warfare have often produced a thorough-going 
political re-organisation that has embedded national values in social life. Victory has 
tended to vindicate war leaders and their vision of the nation, notably in new nation-
states established by liberation or unification wars, where they have become the 
‘fathers’ of their country: Washington and Jefferson for the USA, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk for Turkey, and Castro for Cuba.   State-approved historiographies have 
created teleologies of collective progress that are inculcated in public educational 
systems, festivals and public monuments.    
Arguably the experience of defeat generates more radical popular energies.  In 
the era of nationalism the consequences of defeat were more intense, because of the 
greater scale of wars and because defeat could be seen as moral failure of the people 
itself, not just of its governing class (Horne 2008: 16-7).  This could inspire a popular 
revolt against establishments, the search for an alternative historical vision of the 
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nation, and for scapegoats, and a root and branch reformation of social and political 
institutions. The shattering defeat of Imperial Germany in the First World War with 
the loss of territory and population to neighbouring states inspired not only leftist 
revolutionary movements but also radical nationalist programmes of regeneration and 
irredentism.  These latter campaigns were spearheaded by ex-soldier’s organizations 
embittered at the loss of military prestige, and by populations uprooted from their 
former homelands.   
 All four factors contribute to the social embedding of myths by a variety of 
social actors so that these myths became available as resources for interpreting and 
giving meaning to everyday life experiences.  In high culture the images of past 
conflicts have been mined to throw light on the present, as in Dickens’s The Tale of 
Two Cities, one of whose purposes was to warn the governing classes in Victorian 
Britain against the dangers of reactionary politics by depicting the chasm between the 
French poor and their opulent aristocracy.    In an era of potentially alienating social 
change, the streets and squares of mushrooming cities in the 19th century were 
‘historicised’ by naming them after national heroes and famous battles (for example, 
Trafalgar Square).  The charisma of dead heroes (such as Napoleon in France) was 
reproduced and consumed by the general population in legends, songs, novels, 
clothing and household objects (Hazareesingh 2004: Ch. 3).    Later in the nineteenth 
century, novel genres of popular fiction and children’s comics, catering to the literate, 
created national and imperial martial models of chivalrous manhood to ‘civilize’ 
rising generations of male youth (Paris 2000: Chs. 1 and 2).     
 This interweaving sets of myths and legends provided a common set of idioms 
and reference points that political elites used, often unself-consciously, to 
communicate with a larger audience.   The study of how they furnish languages 
through which ordinary individuals articulated their relationships and tastes is still yet 
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to be fully explored, but there is little doubt about the growing relevance of such 
national myths to the constitution of everyday life (see Zerubavel 2003: Ch. 2). This 
popular culture has formed the base on which more formal and didactic remembrance 
ceremonies rest.  
 
Tensions and interplays between states and nations 
 
This might imply that in the modern period the political and social embedding of 
national myths and symbols results in an increasing integration of state and nation.   
However, war has also in the modern period periodically uncaged populations by 
threatening the overthrow of states, foreign occupation, the radical redrawing of 
boundaries, and the forced redistribution of populations between states. The 
disjunctures between states and nations, activated by the fortunes of war, have been 
one of the recurring triggers of nationalism.  It is in such liminal moments when the 
existing order is threatened with dissolution that one sees heightened debates about 
national traditions to redefine who constitute the people (should they be defined by 
ethnic or civic criteria?), where the homeland is located and on what basis a national 
state can be reconstituted.   This can be a prolonged process in which rival 
intellectuals from different nations as well competing protagonists from within 
nations become involved. 
 Even the two most powerful states in modern Europe, France and Germany, 
were subject to such instability.   France was occupied wholly or in part by foreign 
powers several times, in 1814, in 1870, and in the First and Second World Wars.  The 
German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 generated the famous debate 
between German and French intellectuals (between, for example, Theodor Mommsen 
and Ernest Renan) about how membership of the nation should be decided, whether 
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by the ‘subjective’ choice of its inhabitants or by ‘objective’ criteria such as language.  
The wars also produced a recurring struggle between competing ideas of French 
nationalism, republican, Imperial-Bonapartist and Catholic-traditionalist, whose rise 
and fall was triggered by periods of defeat (Hutchinson 2005: Ch. 3).   What is 
notable is that both republicans and anti-republicans looked back to medieval history 
to ground their projects, in particular to the figure of Joan of Arc, who expelled 
English invaders from its soil.  Whereas to republicans, she embodied the democratic 
spirit of the France, crushed by monarchy and Catholic reaction, to the anti-
republicans she was the expression of a European Catholic civilisation of which of 
which France was the ‘Eldest Daughter’.  By the 1880s the Third Republic made her 
feast day a national holiday, and in the First World War she became a figure of unity 
when right wing nationalists and republicans joined in great festivals devoted to her 
cult that mobilised the French against German invaders.  During Second World War 
she was invoked by opposing sides, by Petain and by de Gaulle, to link past and 
present in order to articulate hopes for the future (Gildea 1994: Ch.5). 
The contemporary German preoccupation with their ‘unmasterable past’ owes 
much to the legacy of the Holocaust, but it has also been shaped by a long range 
political and territorial instability as a result of war.  A cultural conception of the 
German nation preceded the formation of a German state (though one also shaped by 
memories of the Holy Roman Empire).   Warfare created the German nation-state in 
1871 but also has regularly endangered it.  After unification Germany was regarded 
by the advocates of Grossdeutschland as an unfinished nation-state, failing to include 
all Germans and with substantial Danish, Polish and Walloon minorities within its 
1871 borders.  In the 20th century Germany’s borders radically expanded or contracted 
nine times (in 1914, 1918, 1923, 1939, 1941, 1945, 1949, 1961, and 1990), largely 
through war or state collapse. (Jarausch and Geyer 2003: 350).  For much of this time, 
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a sense of political and military rivalry with France, Britain and Russia as well as 
Germany’s shifting geography resulted in recurring debates between advocates of a 
‘Western’ liberal-democratic individualistic and an ‘Eastern’ authoritarian organic 
conception of nationality.  As Jarausch and Geyer argue (2003: 352-3), disrupted 
territorial units lead also to disrupted time, to multiple competing histories in which it 
is impossible to construct simple historical continuities on which stable identities rest.    
The question of the strength of its Eastern Prussian heritage versus its recommitment 
to Western liberal-democratic values re-emerged in the debates after German 
unification about the siting of its capital in Berlin or Bonn. This German territorial 
instability in the very centre of Europe in turn destabilised the histories of its 
neighbours both to the East and the West.    
 
Warfare and the International System 
    
If this demonstrates the dynamic interplay between state and nation formation in 
Europe activated by war, it remains true that the European pattern of incessant 
interstate warfare has resulted in a rough congruence between ethnographic and 
political boundaries.  Arguably Europe, however, is not the norm, but rather the world 
exception (Centeno 2002).   The majority of nation-states along with the modern 
international system came into being recently by a completely different martial route: 
of sudden imperial dissolution in three convulsive waves during the 20th century.  The 
first was the collapse in total war of the dynastic continental empires in Central, 
Eastern and Southern Europe at the end of the First World War; the second the break-
up nation-state overseas empires in Asia and Africa after the Second World War; and 
the third began with the collapse of the Soviet Union from the intensifying military 
and economic pressures of the Cold War.   
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Nationalism within these empires had been with some exceptions a relatively 
weak force, confined mainly to educated elites, but was transformed by total war.  In 
both World Wars imperial minorities were politicized by large scale military 
recruitment, the use of forced labour in agriculture and industry, and the ferocious 
extraction of resources, leading at times to famine.  To this was added, in the First 
World War, mass ethnic displacements and scapegoating of minorities; and in the 
Second World War the triumphs of Japanese armies in Asia that shattered European 
prestige and destroyed their collaborator networks (Hutchinson 2017: Ch.3).   
The effects of relatively sudden imperial dissolutions were, as Aviel Roshwald 
(2001) argued with respect to the First World War, to catapult into power nationalist 
elites governing ill-defined territorial units, sometimes carved violently out of 
ethnically disputed territories, lacking developed economic and political institutions.  
Indeed, a mass of (often fragile) nation-states imbued with a sense of victimhood and 
political vulnerability have been thrust into a hierarchical state order still dominated 
by great powers.  It is widely assumed that the World Wars have decisively brought 
an end to the era of empires.  However, the disruptive effects of this large-scale entry 
of such ethnically diverse states - often with unresolved boundary issues with 
neighbours - has regularly resulted in projects of re-imperialization and wars of 
aggression by great powers.   
Of course, there had long been a hybridisation between the national and 
imperial principles.  The rise of many European nation-states in the medieval period 
had been accompanied by imperial expansion, both through the colonisation of 
immediate neighbours and the conquest of overseas territories. Although in the 
modern period liberal nationalists might reject empire, racial nationalists asserted the 
rights of elite nations to rule over others.  These latter extolled empire as integral to 
national prestige and as justifying claims of a civilizing mission.   As revolutions in 
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industry, communications, and trade demonstrated the global interdependence of 
states, so by the late 19th and early 20th centuries imperialist nationalists dreamed of 
creating pan-national or racial blocs (Anglo-Saxon, Slavic, Germanic, Asian). This in 
the belief that only units of near continental scale could provide geo-political and 
economic security (Darwin 2008: Ch. 5; Lieven 2015: Ch. 1).   
Imperial dissolution in the 20th century has been followed by imperial 
rollbacks in part arising from the security problems created by the new states, in part 
from temptations to exploit power vacuums.  After the First World War the 
Bolsheviks largely reconstituted the Russian Empire; Hitler resurrected dreams of 
Mitteleuropa; Mussolini’s Italy sought an African Empire, while Japan in the 1930s 
began its drive for an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.  As the Nazi empire crumbled 
in 1945, so the Soviet Union expanded into Eastern Europe.   
Is the Soviet Union the last empire?  Mark Beissinger (2005: 33) suggests not.   
He argues that in the contemporary era, empire can be redefined to refer to 
illegitimate relationships of control by one national political society over another. 
This definition not only applies at times to the postwar United States, Russia, China 
and perhaps the (Franco-German dominated) EU, but also to the interstate system 
itself.  The provisions of the United Nations Charter, established by the great states, 
seek to tame the principle of national self -determination by rendering illegitimate any 
interference in the territorial integrity of existing states. As Ian  Clark (2001: 250) 
argues, norms of state sovereignty and restrictions of self-determination to state 
territorial units constitute a form of imperial rule by established states that deny the 
rights of stateless nations.  This renders dubious Tilly’s arguments (1992: Ch.6) that 
interstate warfare creates homogenous nations states, and through subsequent 
international treaties, a world of nation-states.  Instead, on balance war and the major 
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post war settlements have intensified dislocations between the world of states and the 
world of nations.  
   
Contemporary warfare and post nationalist debates 
 
What then of our current situation?  Many have argued that the old relationships 
between war and national reproduction are obsolete.  The experiences of two world 
wars (of mass destruction and genocide) is blamed on national rivalries. Together 
with the development of nuclear weaponry, this is taken to demonstrate that the 
institution of interstate war is a direct threat to the existence of national peoples, and 
that only forms of transnational governance can save us (UN and the EU).  In Western 
Europe there has been a shift from mass conscription to small professional armies and 
large-scale demilitarisation (Howard: 1976: Ch.7). Outside the West, intra-state 
conflicts predominate in fragile new states, undermining the possibility of nation-
building (Kaldor 2006).   
 In an interdependent world the security implications of weak states continue to 
result in quasi-imperial military interventions by great states, but they tend to be 
justified by international (for example, via the United Nations) and humanitarian 
mandates.  Even so, such military missions are hobbled by casualty aversion as, it is 
claimed,  demographic decline makes European citizens increasingly unwilling to risk 
their children (Lachmann 2013). Everywhere in a post-imperial world there is a shift 
away from heroic martial myths that legitimised nation-states to traumatic narratives 
that focuses on victimised peoples (Barzan 2000).  
These analyses have some force.  But such post-national perspectives are 
largely limited to Western Europe, and arise from the special horrors of the two 
World Wars. Casualty aversion in the West may exist with respect to foreign military 
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interventions, but this is in response to doubts about the official rationale of these 
wars, rather than of war itself.  In Asia and the Middle East nationalist tensions 
between regional powers are intensifying.  Many of the intra-state wars (contrary to 
Mary Kaldor’s claims) do contribute to nation-state formation; e.g. the recent wars in 
the Balkans and Sri Lanka (Malešević 2010: 325).    Moreover, while universal norms 
might justify international intervention, coalitions of nation-states, rather than the UN 
per se, remain central to defending conceptions of world order.  To mobilise support 
from their electorates for such military interventions, state elites must invoke national 
security considerations (Ryan 2014). Romantic ideas of war may seem outmoded in 
favour of a greater recognition of individual loss.  Nonetheless, ‘heroic’ 
commemorative frames maintain their potency, as indicated in the continued 
resonance of the remembrance ceremonies of the First World War, while the 
perceptions of war as traumatic may itself contribute to national solidarities.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Bringing warfare into theories of nationalism  challenges those approaches that that 
understand national and nation-state formation as a product of modernisation, since 
war is an unpredictable phenomenon that crosses the premodern-modern divide, with 
often far reaching consequences.  Wars tend to embed a sense of historicity (however 
mythic) into emergent nations when they set in chain long lasting developments, 
memories of which shape populations’ perceptions of their place in space and time 
and belief systems.  Such perceptions inflect how states and their populations engage 
with modernisation, which throws up threats as well as opportunities.  One of the 
claims of nationalists, sometimes in association with, sometimes in opposition to, 
religious adherents, is to make sense of the randomness of history, often created by 
22 
 
the vicissitudes of war. Given that nationalists define the nation as a community of 
ultimate loyalty, performance in war has been used as a test of the potency of national 
identity, failure in which continues to lead to prolonged crises of reflection and 
revaluation with major cultural and political consequences - as we saw in the USA 
after the Vietnam war.   
Wars vary in their characteristics, and when we consider the relationship 
between war and nationalism we need to consider the type of war and the context in 
which it is fought.    Our view of the nation-state is structured by the consequences of 
interstate warfare on the European subcontinent from which arose a rough 
correspondence between state and nation.  In playing a significant part in the 
construction of the nation-state, European warfare then provided the framework for 
the triple revolutions (political, economic and cultural) of modernity.   But most of the 
polities we call nation-states have arisen via imperial collapse in total war and deviate 
considerably from the European ‘norm’.   Such nation-states, if we can call them that, 
by virtue of their fractured character and economic vulnerability, cannot easily be 
depicted as the institutional vessels of industrial modernisation.  The modern 
international system itself also seems removed from the harmonious system of locks 
that Gellner envisaged in his earlier writings on nationalism.  Formal empires may 
have largely come to an end, but the new states confront a world economic and 
political system dominated by Western powers that itself has an imperial character.    
The security problems of the postcolonial world themselves invite forms of re-
imperialisation by competing great powers, including Russia and China. These 
multiple challenges are the source of much of the current world disorders and 
generate further rounds of nationalism. 
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1 Tilly (1992: 44) defines the state ‘as any organization that commanded substantial means 
of coercion and successfully claimed the durable priority over other 
users of coercion within at least one bounded territory.’   Note there is no reference to legitimacy. 
2 Mann distinguishes between states exercising despotic 
and infrastructural power, the first a zero-sum approach that operates through 
coercion, and the second that is generative arising from social cooperation.  During the later 
Middle Ages states began to exercise power through co-ordination with other power groups, 
though this was in the form of a territorial federalism. The nation-state is in effect the organic 
state (fused with the interests of  dominant classes), which is able to penetrate much of society.  
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This, he claims, does not emerge until the time of the 1688 Revolution in Englandj (Mann 1986: 
Ch. 14). 
